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Abstract
We present the design and implementation of the
PeerShare, a system that can be used by applic-
ations to securely distribute sensitive data to so-
cial contacts of a user. PeerShare incorporates a
generic framework that allows different applications
to distribute data with different security require-
ments. By using interfaces available from existing
popular social networks, PeerShare is designed to
be easy to use for both end users as well as de-
velopers of applications. PeerShare can be used to
distribute shared keys, public keys and any other
data that need to be distributed with authenticity
and confidentiality guarantees to an authorized set
of recipients, specified in terms of social relation-
ships. We have used PeerShare already in three
different applications and plan to make it available
for developers.
1 Motivation
Key management has been one of the challenging
problems in guaranteeing secure communication
between parties on the Internet. Although pub-
lic key technology holds the promise of simplify-
ing key management, multiple technical, economic,
legal and social reasons prevented PKIs to be suc-
cessfully deployed in the Internet, thus leaving the
problem of secure key distribution still wide open
[11].
Recent years have also brought a tremendous in-
crease in the popularity of social networks. Social
networks (like Facebook[1], or Twitter[2]), by giv-
ing users opportunity to share data among their
friends and by providing APIs for third party de-
velopers, open new possibilities for creation of ap-
plications using social graph data. The most im-
portant aspects of social networks in the context of
data distribution are:
• the possibility of common user authentication
by means of the Single Sign-on service and the
OAuth protocol [12],
• the extensive scale of deployment of popular
social networks, and
• the ability for users to express social relation-
ships in an intuitive manner (e.g., “friends”,
“colleagues”, “friends of friends” etc.)
Our starting point is the observation that one
can use social networks to facilitate the distribu-
tion of authentic public keys [15]. One can gener-
alize this to design a generic framework that allows
distribution of arbitrary application-specific sens-
itive data with specific security requirements (like
authenticity-only or authenticity and confidential-
ity) to a specific set of social contacts. The result
is a system we call PeerShare, which we describe
in this paper.
Our goal and contribution. In this paper we
present PeerShare: the design and implementation
of a system that allows users to distribute data se-
curely. PeerShare distinguishes itself from other
data distribution systems through:
• incorporating a generic framework for
data distribution that can be used by dif-
ferent applications to distribute different types
of data (e.g., shared secret keys, public keys,
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other sensitive data) to a specified set of social
contacts with different security guarantees.
• improving usability both for end-users
and application developers by taking ad-
vantage of existing and popular social network
tools for the user authentication and distribu-
tion of data inside a specific social context.
In our implementation, we use on Facebook as
the social network. The social network server
is used for user authentication and for users to
define social groups either as pre-defined lists (like
“friends” or “friends-of-friends”) or custom lists.
However, our system is generic and can use any so-
cial network that supports a single sign on (SSO)
and authorization mechanism (like OAuth 2.0) and
provides an interface for apps access user’s social
graph information. Given the scale of social net-
works deployment, the SSO using the social net-
work greatly increases the usability of user authen-
tication. Social graph information is used only for
obtaining user specific friend lists which can be used
to specify access control for the data being distrib-
uted.
The social network server is not involved in ac-
tual data distribution; that is done through the
PeerShare server containing database with data to
be distributed to specified users. PeerShare client-
side implementation, called the PeerShare Service,
is responsible for uploading new data to the server,
deleting old data items, and periodically querying
the server to check if there are any new data for
them uploaded by other devices. PeerShare Ser-
vice exposes an API towards applications which
allow them to make use of PeerShare function-
ality. The communication between the client and
the server is via an authenticated secure channel.
PeerShare server is assumed to be a trusted entity.
In Section 5, we discuss ways of reducing this trust
assumption.
Outline. We describe usage scenarios in Section
2 which motivate usage of PeerShare. Section 3
presents system requirements. Section 4 includes
detailed system design, while Section 5 describes
security considerations of the system. Section 6
presents the related work. Finally, section 7 con-
cludes the paper.
2 Usage scenarios
Currently PeerShare is already used in three
example applications, namely PeerSense [10],
SCAMPI [16] and CrowdShare [3][4].
PeerSense [10] is a service on a mobile device
that senses the presence of nearby friends. Applic-
ations can query PeerSense for the set of nearby
friends at any given moment(e.g. the camera ap-
plication can query the set of nearby friends at
the time when the shutter is pressed and attach
this information as metadata to the resulting pic-
ture [17]. PeerSense uses PeerShare to distribute
the binding between the Bluetooth Device Address
(BDADDR) and the social network identifier of the
device user to the set of users who the device user
wants to be visible to. Although BDADDR itself
is not secret, the binding is. Hence, the data share
via PeerShare needs secrecy and authenticity. At
any given time a device is associated with at most
one user, whereas a user may be associated with
multiple devices. Thus, the data is device-specific.
The SCAMPI platform [16] allows mobile
devices to communicate in the opportunistic net-
work. Mobile devices discover themselves through
multicasting their SCAMPI identifiers, which are
hashes of their public keys. As such identifiers are
not very meaningful to use, the SCAMPI platform
uses PeerShare for mapping the SCAMPI identifi-
ers to social identifiers. Similarly to PeerSense, the
exchanged data is a binding, thus it is private and
also device-specific.
In the CrowdShare project [3][4], devices in the
network are able to share their resources with
one another based on existing social relationships.
CrowdShare presents privacy-preserving friend of
friend finder service based on the private set inter-
section (PSI) algorithm [7]. The input to PSI con-
sists of a set of “bearer tokens”. A bearer token is
generated by the device of a user and is distributed
to all friends of that user. It serves as a capability
for proving the friend relationship. The data shared
using PeerShare are the bearer tokens. They are
user-specific and require both authenticity and in-
tegrity.
Furthermore, CrowdShare can optionally make
use of user-specific public keys. Distribution of
public keys is done similarly to the SocialKeys pro-
ject [15], but using PeerShare. The exchanged
data would then be a binding between a public key
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Table 1: Summary of existing PeerShare use cases
Use case Type of data Security need Specificity
PeerSense BDADDR:social-ID private device-specific
SCAMPI SCAMPI-ID:social-ID private device-specific
FoF finder bearer token private user-specific
Public key distribution public key public user-specific
and a social identifier. Thus, such binding is public
and user-specific.
Table 1 presents a short summary of existing
PeerShare use cases.
Finally, there are also possible situations in
which, we are interested in making a binding
between a data item and a specific user that does
not use the PeerShare system. To do this, we intro-
duce also the notion of data binding type. If data is
uploaded normally by the application, we call it a
owner-asserted binding. However, if a user decides
to add a binding for another user, such binding is
called user-asserted, and is only visible to the user
that has created it. An example of such a situ-
ation is present in the PeerSense application. A
user can tag a device on the list of scanned devices
and assign a name of his/her friend to it. Since
there is no evidence for the correctness of such a
user-asserted binding, it is not distributed using
PeerShare, but is still available via the PeerShare
API in the devices of the user who asserted the
binding.
Given the common aspects of these different
cases of secure data distribution, it is evident that
designing a generic data distribution framework
would improve ease of development, use and secur-
ity.
3 System requirements
3.1 PeerShare goals
Our vision of a successful data distribution system
sets three basic goals for it to fulfil:
1. Data security⇒ assurance of data security is
the most critical requirement to convince users
to the distribution system.
2. Usability ⇒ the system should be as easy to
use as possible for users, thus necessary user
interaction should be minimised.
3. Deployability ⇒ the system should be scal-
able to allow various application developers to
easily distribute their data though it.
3.2 Assumptions
Our threat model assumes that each device has
platform security that:
• isolates applications from one another (both
during execution time and in terms of persist-
ent storage),
• allows a service on the device to learn a
platform-specific identity of a calling applic-
ation that wants to access the service.
3.3 Threats
We need to provide protection against the following
threats:
1. Man-in-the-middle Attacks ⇒ any net-
work devices that route messages between the
mobile device and the server should not be able
to act as man-in-the-middle that eavesdrops on
or modifies messages.
2. Unauthorized Usage ⇒ only the person
that has created the data item should be able
to later modify or erase it. Furthermore, as
data are created by applications that use the
PeerShare system, only the application that
has created the particular data item should be
able to access, modify or delete it. Finally,
data should be distributed by the PeerShare
server only to users that are eligible to obtain
them.
3.4 Security requirements
Communication channel protection is required to
prevent a man-in-the-middle attack. The threat
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Figure 1: PeerShare architecture.
of unauthorized usage motivates usage of server
authentication, mobile application authentication,
user authentication and application access control.
4 System design
The PeerShare system allows for creation, stor-
age and distribution of application specific data se-
curely. The system consists of two main compon-
ents: (1) PeerShare Service, and (2) PeerShare
Server, which are described below. Figure 1 illus-
trates the system overview.
4.1 PeerShare Service
The PeerShare Service is the encapsulation of the
PeerShare functionality on the mobile device. It
is exposed to other applications via the PeerShare
API described later in the section. It is also re-
sponsible for communication with the PeerShare
Server, which is described in the section 4.3, along
with the protocol between the client and the server.
The heart of the service is internal database that
stores data together with their mappings to social
identities, which are obtained from the server. The
database security is guaranteed by the mobile plat-
form security. Data are bound to social identities
by means of social network authentication.
The service stores a data item inside the App-
Data data structure which is described by the fol-
lowing attributes:
1. Data type binds item to particular type (e.g.
Bluetooth MAC address), or application (e.g.
SCAMPI identifier). Please refer to section 2
for more details.
2. Data value is the actual value of the item.
For instance, it can be a SCAMPI identifier,
or Bluetooth MAC address, etc.
3. Data description attributes
• Data algorithm describes sequence of
data procession from its original form to
the stored one (e.g. if MAC address is
stored as SHA-1 hash, data algorithm
value is set to SHA-1 ),
• Specificity defines if data is device spe-
cific (i.e., it is bound to a device like MAC
address and multiple values on different
devices can be assigned to one user), or
it is user specific (i.e., only one data in-
stance can be created for the user. For ex-
ample, bearer token used to detect pres-
ence of your friend),
• Sensitivity states if data are public or
private. For public data (like public key),
4
data authenticity is guaranteed, whereas
for private items, data secrecy is addition-
ally guaranteed,
• Binding type defines two types: owner
asserted binding and user asserted one,
• Description is a human readable text
that describes what information the item
contains.
4. Data sharing policy specifies with whom the
item is to be shared. For example, sharing
policy may include all my friends in the social
network, or just a subset of them.
5. Timestamps
• Data creation timestamp describes
when the data item has been created,
• Data expiry timestamp specifies when
the validity of the data item expires.
6. Social information
• Data owner social identifier is the so-
cial ID of the user inside the social net-
work (e.g. user ID in Facebook),
• Data owner social name is the stand-
ard name used by the user in the social
network (e.g. John Smith),
• Data owner social network specifies
which social network is used to bind data
to particular person (e.g. Facebook).
7. Creator application identifier
• Mobile platform identifier (e.g. An-
droid, iOS, Windows Phone),
• Platform-specific application identi-
fier specifies minimal set of elements al-
lowing for unique identification (within a
given mobile platform) of an application
that has created the data (e.g. package
name and developer key for Android).
Table 2 presents the summary of the most import-
ant AppData attributes.
Furthermore, the service provides application
level data access control which guarantees that only
authorized applications can modify or delete exist-
ing data. Any application can create data that it
intends to share using the system. During the ini-
tial data upload process, the service records the
calling application platform specific identifier (e.g.
pair of Android package name and developer key)
and appends it to the created data. As a result,
if an application wants to modify or delete existing
data, the service learns the calling application iden-
tifier and verifies it against the application identi-
fier recorded in the initial upload process.
The final responsibility of the service is a peri-
odic update of the database state. The service has
implemented a timer mechanism that fires every
six hours. Upon it, the service tries to connect to
the server and fetch all eligible data from it. If the
service is not running in the instant of timer ex-
piry, the refresh operation is postponed until the
service is started again. The fact that the service
is not running also means that there is no third
party application that needs access to data, thus
postponing of database update does not introduce
any limitations to the service.
The PeerShare API is the second part of the
mobile application. It provides the interface for
third-party applications for creation, modification
and removal of data that an application wishes to
share with other application users. The most im-
portant methods are described below:
long addData(AppData data)
When an application wishes to share new data
through the PeerShare system, it should use
this method. It stores application data and
uploads it to the PeerShare Server as soon as
the network connectivity to the server is estab-
lished. The method returns object identifier
which the application should use in the future
to modify, or delete this data item.
int updateData(long objectID, AppData data)
This method is intended for modification
of already existing data. The object ID ob-
tained in the addNewSecret method identifies
the data item to update.
long removeData(long objectID)
This method deletes existing data. It requires
the object ID to identify which data is to
be removed. The object ID obtained in the
addNewData method identifies the data item
to update.
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Table 2: Summary of PeerShare data attributes
Data attribute Description
Data type Mapping of data to particular type, or application
Data value Actual value of data
Data description attributes
Provides more detailed description of a data item by indicating al-
gorithm used for its creation, specificity, sensitivity and binding type
Data sharing policy Specifies sharing policy for data
Timestamps Indicates timestamps for data creation and its validity
Social information Social information that is bound to data
Creator application identifier Identifies mobile platform and application that owns a data item
Other methods
The application interface defines also other
methods that can be used for retrieval of spe-
cific data (e.g. getSharedDataDetail), finding
out social information related to the currently
logged in social network user (i.e., getMySo-
cialData), and learning available data access
control policies (i.e., getACLPolicies).
4.2 PeerShare Server
The PeerShare Server is the trusted entity that
is primarily responsible for secure storage of data.
Every data item is bound to a social identifier of the
user (e.g. Facebook user ID) who has created the
item. The server authenticates users by requiring
them to provide a valid social network user access
token and verifying its correctness through interac-
tion with the social network server.
The second crucial responsibility of the server
is enforcement of access control policies for stored
data. The system allows users to specify who is eli-
gible to access stored data by allowing them to state
the sharing policy from all available social network
user lists of the user. The server queries the social
network server for custom friend lists created in the
social network by a user. Such lists are returned
to the PeerShare service and can be further ac-
cessed by other applications to allow them specify
the sharing policy. On creating a new data item, or
updating sharing policy for the existing item, the
server queries the social network server to obtain
the list of social user IDs applicable to download
particular data item. If an application uploading a
new data item does not specify its sharing policy,
the data item is by default shared among all user’s
friends.
Furthermore, the server updates lists of users as-
signed to particular friend list in case of their modi-
fication by means of the realtime updates provided
by the social network. If the social network does
not have this functionality, the server must regu-
larly poll the social network server to learn about
changes in the friend lists.
Finally, users are allowed to overwrite data shar-
ing policy specified by an application via the web
interface (see figure 2(a)). In such situation, shar-
ing policy specified by the user is updated on the
server that is going to distribute updated item ac-
cording to the new sharing policy.
4.3 PeerShare Protocol
The PeerShare service communicates with the
server through the JSON encoded protocol that
runs on top of standard HTTPS protocol. It in-
volves following operations: user registration and
unregistration, data upload and update, and data
download. Because data exchanged between the
service and the server are sensitive, communication
security is guaranteed by the TLS layer. Further-
more, to protect against fake social network ap-
plication attack, each request includes user access
token of the social network, whose validity is veri-
fied by the server.
In the REGISTER method, the user registers
for the service by informing the server about
his/her social information. In response, the server
generates (or finds if the user is not a new one)
user’s PeerShare identifier that is needed in all
subsequent transactions with the server to uniquely
identify the correct person. The PeerShare ID is
necessary to properly correlate possible multiple so-
cial identities of the same person. This may happen
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if someone uses more than one social network in the
PeerShare system (e.g. Facebook and Twitter).
In the UPLOAD method, the service sends to
the server all data items which have been added to
the database on the user’s device, but have not been
uploaded on the PeerShare server. The message
contains also the PeerShare ID to map uploaded
data to a specific user. Content of each data item
is consistent with data description provided in the
section 4.1. In response to the UPLOAD request,
the server sends an array of object IDs that are
later used to modify or delete every data item from
the server database.
The UPDATE method is very similar to UP-
LOAD. The only difference is that it is not adding
any new data on the server, but only updating ex-
isting ones. The object ID returned in the UP-
LOAD operation is needed to properly identify the
item on the server to modify. If the service wants
to update a non-existing item (i.e., the one that has
already been deleted by the user), the server ignores
the request to do it, and sends back in response
notification that the data item does not exist and
should be removed from the local database.
The DOWNLOAD method allows the service
to fetch all data items that the registered user is
eligible to obtain. It requires the service to provide
user’s PeerShare ID to correlate the request with
the correct user. In response, the server returns an
array of data items that contain detailed informa-
tion about each item in a format similar to the one
used in the UPLOAD or UPDATE request. The
only difference is that personal information (i.e.,
sharing policy, and object ID) is not included un-
less the downloading user is the owner of the item.
The DELETE method is used to erase old and
no longer needed data from the server. Similarly to
all other methods, it must include the PeerShare
ID to correctly correlate user with data. In addi-
tion, it also contains an array of object identifiers
that are to be deleted. In response, the server sends
just status information that is either OK if there
are no errors, or is an error message.
UNREGISTER is the final method defined in
the protocol. It is used to unregister the user from
the PeerShare and delete all data associated with
the user. In the request, the PeerShare ID together
with the social network identifiers are provided.
The server responds with OK status, or an error
message if it fails to unregister the user.
Table 3 provides a short summary of all protocol
methods.
4.4 Implementation
Our server implementation consists of a couple of
PHP scripts, PostgreSQL database and the Face-
book PHP SDK. Currently the server supports
only Facebook as the social network to authentic-
ate with, but the architecture is generic enough, so
that in the future it can be easily extended to sup-
port other social networks. Finally, the server takes
advantage of Facebook Realtime Updates function-
ality to learn about modifications of user’s lists.
The service implementation is more complex, as
it includes the communication module as well as
API for third party applications. Currently we have
the Android implementation of the client pack-
age. The service is implemented as a standard An-
droid background service that runs as an independ-
ent process. It contains internal SQLite database,
where PeerShare data are stored. Applications us-
ing the service bind to it through the AIDL inter-
face. SSO user authentication is currently provided
by native Facebook library. If multiple social net-
works are available in the future, native libraries
providing SSO authentication will also be added.
The service uses also Binder interface functionality
to learn about service calling application identifi-
ers. It allows matching calling applications with
data they create, which is critical to provide ap-
plication access control.
4.5 Deployment and performance
considerations
The PeerShare system has up to now been success-
fully deployed in three projects, as described in the
section 2.
To evaluate performance of the PeerShare, we
have tested average time needed for upload and
download of data in the WiFi network that uses
ADSL connection. In our test scenarios, a user up-
loads 1 data item, and downloads 5 data items, as
5 friends share sample data in a test application.
Average upload time measured in 30 runs is 2.02
seconds with standard deviation of 1.33 seconds.
Download operation performance is more stable,
as average time is 1.18 seconds with standard de-
viation of 0.12 seconds. To compare these num-
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Table 3: Summary of PeerShare protocol methods
Protocol method Description
REGISTER
Registers user to the system. Creates unique PeerShare identifier for the
user to utilise later in every interaction with the server.
UPLOAD Uploads new data to the server.
UPDATE Modifies already existing data with updated values.
DOWNLOAD Fetches all data shared with the user from the server to the mobile device.
DELETE Deletes no longer needed data from the server.
UNREGISTER
Erases all user data from the server when he/she does not want to use
the system anymore.
bers with standard web browsing activities, we con-
ducted similar experiments for downloading mo-
bile Facebook web page. Average download time
for Facebook webpage measured in 30 runs is 1.50
seconds with 0.21 seconds of standard deviation.
Furthermore, PeerShare has been designed to
allow multiple applications use the same server.
However, if application performance is limited due
to the server scalability, each application developer
may decide to run its own server. Such a solution
is further discussed in the section 5.3 describing
possibility of minimizing the need of trust for the
PeerShare Server.
5 Security considerations
In this section, we present our security analysis
showing that the security requirements presented
in the section 3 are fulfilled.
5.1 Channel protection
In order to guarantee channel protection,
PeerShare Protocol is executed over a secure
(i.e., confidential and mutually authenticated)
channel. The user is authenticated by the
OAuth protocol via the native Android Facebook
application. Therefore the system relies on cor-
rect behaviour of the native Android Facebook
application.
PeerShare Server is authenticated via a TLS cer-
tificate, We use a form of “certificate pinning” by
embedding the TLS server certificate of PeerShare
Server in the client implementation. This pro-
tects against a rogue server from masquerading as
PeerShare Server even if the rogue server has suc-
cesfully obtained a certificate for its TLS keypair
from one of the tens of Certification Authorities
that are normally trusted for TLS. If there are
many PeerShare Servers, then instead of hardwir-
ing the TLS server certificate, we can use standard
certificate pinning [9].
5.2 User and application authentic-
ation
User authentication is obtained through the native
Facebook Android library. Prior to invoking any
interaction with the server, the service asks the
native Facebook application (through the library
interface) for a valid access token associated with
the authenticated user. Such a valid token must
be included in every message exchanged with the
server. The PeerShare Server uses the Facebook
graph API token debug tool to examine its validity
by checking the following:
• does application identifier encoded inside the
token correspond to the PeerShare Facebook
application identifier
• does user identifier encoded inside the token
correspond to the social identifier included in
the sent message
The former checking protects the server against al-
lowing a fake Facebook application to modify data
on the server. The latter one prevents other users
from modifying or deleting data that do not be-
long to them. Only if both above conditions are
fulfilled, the PeerShare server proceeds with the
request. Otherwise, it responds to the sender with
authentication error.
User access control The user access control
must guarantee that only eligible users are able to
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(a) Screen presenting data owned by a
user
(b) Screen presenting data shared with
a user
Figure 2: Screenshot of the PeerShare graphical
user interface for Android
obtain data from the PeerShare server and that
only the user that has created a particular data
item can modify or delete it. Correct data distri-
bution is secured by the server that learns data
sharing policy from the request to store/update
the data item. For each created/updated sharing
policy, the server interacts with the Facebook graph
API to fetch the list of social user IDs associated
with the given policy. Having obtained such list,
the server stores information about social IDs eli-
gible to download particular data item.
The second problem is resolved on the device
side. Whenever a third party application makes
a request to modify or delete the particular data
item, the PeerShare service checks in the local
database if the item has been created by the user
trying to modify it. If this is true, the service grants
application permission to edit or remove the item.
Otherwise, it denies application access to the given
item.
Application access control As multiple ap-
plications on one mobile device can use the
PeerShare system, there is a threat that a mali-
cious application using the system can modify or
delete a data item that does not belong to it. In
order to protect against this threat, the PeerShare
service has built-in application level access control
enforcement. When an application creates a new
data item, and wants to have it distributed through
the PeerShare system, the service tries to infer the
platform specific calling application identifier and
appends it to the uploaded data. For Android op-
erating system, the application identifier is a tuple
of package name and developer public key that can
be obtained through the Binder interface. On sub-
sequent requests to update/delete the data, the ser-
vice again obtains the identifier of the calling ap-
plication and compares it with the one associated
with object as the creator. In the Android oper-
ating system, this function is performed by verific-
ation if package signatures match. Unfortunately,
some operating system may not permit for the ser-
vice to infer the calling application identifier. In
such case, the caller must explicitly specify the ap-
plication identifier.
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5.3 Minimizing the need to trust
PeerShare Server
Since PeerShare Server has access to all the sensit-
ive data, it needs to be trusted by all participants.
This is a rather strong assumption. There are
two ways to reduce the extent to which PeerShare
Server needs to be trusted:
Use of trusted hardware: If PeerShare Server is
equipped with a hardware security module (HSM)
like the Trusted Platform Module (TPM)1, then
PeerShare server database can be encrypted using
a HSM-resident key. HSM will decrypt the plain-
text and make it available to a process if and only
if the host computer is in the correct configura-
tion (i.e., running the correct PeerShare Sever soft-
ware). An attacker will have to subvert PeerShare
Server process at runtime. If the client devices
also have a hardware-based trusted execution en-
vironment (like On-board Credentials [14], then the
server HSM can encrypt the sensitive data so that
it is accesible only within the client TEE, thereby
not exposing it to the PeerShare Server at all.
Application-specific PeerShare Server: Al-
though we designed PeerShare in such a way that
multiple application developers could use the same
PeerShare Server, in practice, each application de-
veloper could decide to host her own independent
PeerShare Server. This would still allow the be-
nefit of developer ease of use because developers
can re-use our PeerShare implementation, without
asking all developers to trust the same server.
6 Related work
The concept of data sharing with social net-
works support is present also in other works. So-
cialKeys [15] project proposes the idea of distrib-
uting public keys via social networks. PeerShare
extends this concept to: various types of data and
multiple applications.
Backes et al. [5] presents a generic cryptographic
framework that allows social relations establish-
ment and resource sharing with user anonymity,
secrecy of resources, privacy of social relations and
access control secured. Unlike PeerShare that uses
social network specified sharing policies, it requires
1http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/resources/
tpm_main_specification
users to explicitly establish social relationships with
other users which makes it less intuitive for users
in real deployments.
Baden et al. has implemented Persona [6], a dis-
tributed social network with distributed data stor-
age. It provides data access control by employ-
ing a combination of traditional public key cryp-
tography and attribute-based encryption (ABE)
scheme that involves more complex key manage-
ment. Safebook [8] is the implementation of the dis-
tributed social network that improves privacy pro-
tection mechanisms in comparison to other existing
social networks. Improved privacy results from tak-
ing advantage of cooperation between users inside
a peer-to-peer overlay network, named matryoshka,
and trust relations among users to achieve integrity
and privacy properties. Unlike concepts presented
in these works, our goal is not to build a new social
networks, but to make use of existing social net-
works, as one of the requirements of the system is
its deployability. Obviously, if any of these social
networks proves to be successful, we are interested
in taking advantage of their security and privacy
mechanisms in PeerShare.
Jahid et al. has implemented DECENT [13] that
is a decentralized social network system providing
confidentiality and integrity of data that due to
cryptographic mechanisms can be stored in untrus-
ted nodes. Unlike our system, it requires user to ex-
plicitly specify data sharing policy and build their
social relationships, thus it is more difficult to use
in real life than PeerShare.
7 Conclusion
We have described the design and implementation
of PeerShare, the system that allows users for se-
cure and privacy preserving data distribution sys-
tem. It implements a generic framework for data
distribution that can be used by different applica-
tions and provides different levels of security guar-
antees. Furthermore, the system enhances general
usability for end-users and application developers
by using existing and popular social network mech-
anisms for the user authentication and data distri-
bution inside a specific social context.
PeerShare has been used by three different ap-
plications. We plan to make it available to other
application developers.
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